America embraced, then abandoned, globalisation. Our course explores how

America’s role in the rise of globalisation, and in its decline, is among the subjects covered by Economist Education’s six-week online course, International relations: China, Russia, the US and the future of geopolitics. The programme equips professionals to understand the fundamental forces shaping global politics and economics, so they and their organisations can adapt. It explains how bouts of chaos, such as that unleashed by Trump’s erratic trade announcements, might fit into a wider story: in this case, the retreat of globalisation over the past decade or more. This article draws on one of the course’s central observations about the world economy—that it is fracturing—to illustrate the value of that long-term perspective. 

The shape of today’s globalised economy was strongly influenced by America. First, by the preference the country had for rules and institutions, and second, by its belief that globalisation would advance its geopolitical interests and the interests of its corporations. Hence, until Trump, America continually pressed for the expansion and deepening of global economic ties. 

From the final decades of the 20th century—a period coinciding with unrivalled American dominance—the world experienced a golden age of globalisation. International trade rocketed, from 38% of global GDP in 1990 to 57% in 2018. As our course explains, the world became more integrated than in 1914, the peak of the previous age of global integration. The US signed the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1992, linking its economy to those of Mexico and Canada. It helped create the World Trade Organisation in 1995 and it urged other countries to cut barriers to exchange. As trade grew, shipping costs fell further, and countries felt confident enough to cut tariffs. 

The result was even more trade. Globalisation reached unprecedented levels during the first decades of the 21st century. In 2019, the year before covid-19 damaged the global economy, 1.4 tonnes of goods were shipped around the world for each person; flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) amounted to almost $200 for every individual. Our course tells the story of that high point of global interconnectedness and outlines the different forms—economic, technological, social and political—that it took, before explaining how the mood slowly began to sour. 

Even before Trump first took office in 2017 the consensus was shifting. Globalisation is disruptive. It enabled huge reductions in poverty around the world, greater productivity in rich countries, and greater choice and downward pressure on prices for consumers. But it also has costs, and these are concentrated on particular social groups and places, especially on poor people living in former industrial areas; in America, the Midwest. The programme describes the forces that, over time, led many Americans to turn against globalisation.

Shifting attitudes combined with structural economic changes, which were unfolding whether anyone wanted them or not. In the wake of the global financial crisis in 2008, growth in world output stalled—it fell by 0.1% in 2009, although the economies of rich Western countries shrank by more than that. The decades-long advance of multinational firms was halted. Their share of the global profits of all listed firms dropped from 33% in 2008 to 31% in 2018. Similar reversals were visible elsewhere. Cross-border investments and bank loans both fell relative to world GDP in 2007-18. Total FDI fell from a peak of 5.3% of global GDP in 2007 to just 1.9% in 2022. Countries which had once been gathered together in globalisation’s net were pulling apart. All these developments receive focused attention in a module of our course titled “Goodbye globalisation?”.

Globalisation, slowbalisation or nobalisation?

Trump, now back in the White House for his second term, seems bent on accelerating this trend. He is a long-time supporter of tariffs (he once called them “the greatest thing ever invented” and “my favourite word”) and believes that might is right. That perception tends to go alongside a zero-sum view of the world, which says “your gain must be my loss”. Such a view is very different from the belief that when people engage in trade, both sides benefit. 

In early April, having told the world to brace for “Liberation Day”, Trump announced sweeping tariffs on foes and former friends alike. As markets plunged he paused some of his plans. Yet the scale of the shock to global trade remains, The Economist has written, historically unprecedented. By pursuing such policies Trump is questioning the idea that trade and deeper globalisation benefit America. 

For professionals wondering where this leaves them and their organisation, our course can help. Designed by senior journalists at The Economist and featuring invited guests such as Eric Schmidt, a former chief executive of Google, and Michèle Flournoy, a former undersecretary of defence in Barack Obama’s administration, it was updated after Trump’s second victory. But it steps back from recent turbulence to explain how geopolitics were changing before Trump ever got near the White House. It makes a point of thinking long term; in decades, not days. 

The next run of the programme begins on 14th May. Learners will discover that there have been episodes of retreat from globalisation before. After the Great Depression of 1929-33, countries introduced tariffs to limit international trade, which did not regain its share of world output until the 1950s. The world in 2025 is heading into another period when globalisation falters. No one knows exactly what will replace the status quo, but professionals and businesses who understand the history, and are prepared to take an unflinching look at possible futures, will have a competitive advantage.